‘Cooperation’ between PH, China coast guards — why now?

A year and a half ago, after the worst incident between the Philippines’ and China’s militaries in the West Philippine Sea, the two countries touched on the “possible resumption” of a Duterte-era arrangement between their coast guards. 

Nearly two years later, a memorandum that would operationalize the “possible resumption” is seemingly close to completion, according to Beijing’s new envoy to Manila, Jing Quan. The Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) had earlier confirmed the ongoing negotiations for cooperation between the two agencies. 

“The proposed MOU between the PCG and CCG is discussed in the BCM as part of the Practical Cooperation. The DFA consults with the PCG on technical matters,” DFA spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Deputy Assistant Secretary Rogelio Villanueva Jr. said in a text message to Rappler.   

The BCM or the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea is one of the many platforms through which the Philippines and China tackle issues concerning the South China Sea, to include tensions over Beijing’s aggressive actions in areas that are part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. 

A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the China Coast Guard (CCG), should it be negotiated successfully, would seem strange to some. 

After all, it’s the PCG that has borne the brunt of the CCG’s aggressive actions in waters Manila calls the West Philippine Sea. 

Videos from Philippine government agencies and embedded media have shown, repeatedly, how China uses dangerous maneuvers and water cannons to drive away PCG vessels on missions to the West Philippine Sea. The CCG does the same to Filipino fisherfolk in much smaller wooden vessels.

The Philippine military has also been at the receiving end of Chinese harassment. On June 17, 2024, CCG personnel towed the rubber boats of an elite Navy unit during a resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre in Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal. It was that incident, which resulted in the loss of one Filipino soldier’s finger and extensive damage to Philippine military equipment, that triggered interest in coast guard talks in the first place. 

What’s going to be in the new MOU? 

Back in 2024, Filipino and Chinese diplomats discussed the possibility of bringing back the Duterte-era Joint Coast Guard Committee. In January 2025, the DFA said it was hoping to “establish a means of cooperation” between the PCG and the CCG ahead of a BCM in Xiamen. 

No other details about the form of that proposed cooperation have been made public. 

Chinese Ambassador Jing, speaking at a Rotary Club of Manila event on March 19, said the countries’ coast guards “should collaborate on positive initiatives such as environmental protection, trash collection, and search-and-rescue operations,” according to a BusinessMirror report. 

PCG spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Rear Admiral Jay Tarriela, meanwhile, seemingly distanced the organization from the forthcoming MOU. “As far as the PCG is concerned, based on my last conversation with the Commandant, we are not involved in crafting this coast guard cooperation with China, specifically regarding plans for joint patrols,” he told reporters. 

Villanueva, who is under the DFA’s Maritime and Ocean Affairs Office, noted that “discussions have not progressed to include possibility of joint patrols.”

A PCG representative was present during the last BCM held in Xiamen back in January 2025. Another BCM is already in the works, with Manila as the next presumptive host. 

“We have extended the invitation to the PCG and are still finalizing the PH Delegation,” said Villanueva. 

PH, China maritime cooperation 

Circumstances surrounding Philippine and Chinese discussions on the South China Sea have certainly changed since the last BCM or the first time cooperation between the two coast guards were floated during these meetings. 

Following the July 2024 BCM, the two countries forged a “provisional arrangement” or “provisional understanding” on rotation and resupply missions to Ayungin Shoal. Thus far, resupply missions by the Philippine Navy to the BRP Sierra Madre have been incident-free, although the Philippines has stopped embedding media on these missions — in stark contrast to its approach under the transparency initiative, or a National Security Council-led effort to expose Chinese aggression in the West Philippine Sea. 

But tensions remain high in other features in the West Philippine Sea, including Bajo de Masinloc or Scarborough Shoal, which China has controlled access to since 2012. Harassment against Filipino vessels — whether government or of fisherfolk — continues in its vicinity. 

In August 2025, two Chinese ships collided off Bajo de Masinloc as Chinese Navy and CCG vessels tried to chase down a PCG ship. 

There’s also Manila’s chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its goal to finalize the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) between the bloc and China before the year’s end. 

The Philippines has been trying, most markedly since January 2026 or the start of its chairmanship, to improve bilateral relations with China. Before a scheduled round of COC negotiations in Cebu in January 2026, Beijing and Manila met bilaterally for a political dialogue. It was the first meeting of its kind in over a year, or since the last BCM in Xiamen. 

Several times in the Marcos administration, the Philippines and China tried to establish communication lines precisely to manage tensions in the West Philippine Sea. 

Following Marcos’ state visit to Beijing in January 2023, the DFA and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to establish a “communication mechanism on maritime issues.” By May 2023, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said China had not yet formed its team for the communication mechanism.

The DFA would later also express disappointment, through a protest, that it was “unable to reach its counterpart to the maritime communication mechanism for several hours” as the CCG was using water cannons against the PCG in August 2023. 

During a January 2024 BCM meeting in Shanghai, Manila and Beijing promised to improve a “maritime communication mechanism” that would involve not just diplomats but its respective coast guards. 

In July 2024, the two countries expanded on the previous communication agreement, to include representatives designated by their leaders, the foreign ministries, as well as the coast guards.

Incidents of harassment by China continued well after that January 2024 meeting and the July 2024 agreement. – Rappler.com